The Kremlin’s new ultra-nationalists Extremism expert Alexander Verkhovksy explains how far-right groups bolster Russia’s anti-migrant campaign and recruit war veterans into their ranks
In the aftermath of the deadly terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall concert venue last March, the Russian authorities launched a sweeping anti-migrant campaign that's ongoing to this day. Raids targeting migrant workers accused of violating residency rules are still taking place across the country, and in early April, a new law came into effect banning the children of migrants from enrolling in Russian schools unless they pass a Russian language test. At the same time, researchers are noting rise in nationalist sentiment against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. To learn more about these trends, the independent journalists’ cooperative Bereg spoke with Alexander Verkhovsky, the director of the Sova Center, about how the war has shaped public attitudes toward migrants and brought veterans into the ranks of far-right groups. The following translation of that interview has been edited and abridged for length for clarity.
— In your view, how has Russian society’s attitude toward migrants changed during the full-scale war?
— When it comes to migrants, there’s no simple answer to that question. First of all, Russian society isn’t a single, unified organism — changes unfold differently in different segments of the population.
If we’re talking about broader public sentiment, we can look at Levada Center data. But in recent years, polling has been conducted less frequently due to funding shortages, which makes it harder to track clear trends. Still, it’s evident that the high level of intolerance toward “outsiders” seen in the early 2010s hasn’t returned — at least not yet.
Is this related to the war? Again, there’s no definitive answer, and I’m not sure the two processes are directly connected. we’ve seen political anxieties in society shift from one issue to another. People can’t focus on everything at once, so when something like tensions with the West intensifies, other issues — like migration — tend to recede. And the reverse is true as well.
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That pattern, however, seems to have broken down recently. And it doesn’t appear to be tied to the war in Ukraine. A large-scale anti-immigration campaign began back in 2021, involving both media and high-ranking officials. That same year, we saw a wave of major police raids. If you look at the data, 2021 clearly stands out. What triggered it is hard to say — it may not have been a reaction to any specific external event, but something that emerged within the state apparatus itself.
After February 24, 2022, the topic of migrants practically vanished from the public agenda — almost overnight. But gradually, it began returning, louder and more prominently. The conflict with Ukraine was already sharply felt in 2021, but it still wasn’t perceived as a full-scale war. Around that time, the network of legal nationalist organizations began to become more active — groups like Russian Community, for instance.
At first, this movement was hardly visible, simply because it had so few participants. But in relative terms, its growth was significant. Since then, these organizations have continued to develop. And today, it’s obvious — even to those only loosely following this space — that they’ve become a visible part of the socio-political landscape. That’s why I think today’s anti-immigration agenda, which now plays an important role both at the federal level and in the regions, can be traced back to 2021.
As for public sentiment, things are more complicated. I mentioned the Levada study — it was conducted last year, not long after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack, about a month later. And that timing, of course, skews the picture, because society was still in shock. At the time, for example, the word “Tajik” immediately evoked associations with the attack for most respondents. That inevitably influenced the results.
— You mentioned that a large-scale anti-immigration campaign began back in 2021. With that in mind, do you think its resurgence in 2024 was part of a pre-planned strategy? Or was it more of a reaction to the terrorist attack — a move by certain parts of the government to bring the issue back into the spotlight?
— I wouldn’t say the campaign was reactivated specifically in 2024. In fact, the uptick started back in the fall of 2022, when the news agenda began to include topics unrelated to Ukraine for the first time. During the first six months of the war, Ukraine dominated everything. But then rhetoric about the “migrant threat” started creeping back in.
Since then, we’ve seen a steady — if not entirely uniform — increase in attention to the issue. For most of 2024, nothing fundamentally new happened. The response to the Crocus City Hall attack was predictable, especially in the form of police operations. That happens after almost any such incident, even far smaller ones — simply because the state needs to show it’s responding. But those were short-term measures, and they ended fairly quickly.
When it comes to more systemic actions — like statements from officials or proposed legislation — those didn’t come immediately after the attack. They started to appear a few months later. And those were much more serious steps than the usual measures, like banning migrants from working in certain sectors or regions.
Those employment restrictions tend to be more symbolic — a populist gesture meant to say, “Look, we’re doing something, we’ve got this under control.” The truly significant developments, in my view, happened at the federal level. The most notable was the rapid passage of a law limiting access to education for foreign nationals who don’t speak Russian or don’t have official registration. This primarily affects school-age children.
That’s actually a very radical measure — and, frankly, not a very rational one. I honestly can’t recall another instance where the federal government fully adopted a proposal that previously had only been voiced by fringe nationalist groups. Yes, the issue is real. But for such an extreme initiative not only to be voiced, but also implemented at the state level — I don’t remember that happening before.
— Over the past year, have there been any notable changes in the activities of far-right groups in Russia? I mean both organizations like Russian Druzhina, Russian Community, and Northern Man, as well as more radical groups that trace their roots back to BORN and similar movements.
— I think it makes sense to talk about two distinct levels here — the legal and the illegal. And in my view, these are two separate spheres that, at least for now, either don’t intersect at all or only do so minimally. As far as I know, there are no close connections between them.
If we’re talking about the legal side — groups like Russian Community and similar organizations — then there have definitely been some changes. Above all, in terms of numbers: there are now more such organizations, they’re more geographically dispersed, and their level of activity has clearly increased. There’s also been a shift in the balance of influence within this space. Whereas Russian Community was once just one of several major players, it’s now the undisputed leader, well ahead of the rest.
— Are we seeing more of these groups attract people returning from the front? And do you see a risk that over time, these structures might evolve into something resembling paramilitary formations within Russia — with their own influence, discipline, resources, and a kind of special status?
— If we’re talking about the prospects of paramilitarization, then we’re definitely not talking about groups like Russian Community or Russian Druzhina. They lack the structures or practices typical of real paramilitary units, and are unlikely to develop them anytime soon.
It’s a very different story with anonymous, neo-Nazi militant groups. Many don’t even have names, but they’re highly active — carrying out attacks on migrants, LGBTQ+ individuals, the homeless, drug users, Communist Party supporters, and anyone they perceive as “antifa.” The number of such attacks is rising rapidly — so rapidly, in fact, that even longtime observers of the far-right scene admit they haven’t seen this kind of growth in years. True, the overall scale of violence still hasn’t reached the levels we saw 15 years ago, but we’re moving in that direction quickly.
According to the SOVA Center, the number of serious attacks last year is already comparable to 2011. Fortunately, there have been almost no killings so far. These groups operate with caution, despite being made up mostly of very young people. But there is a risk that as they get older, the level of violence could increase — unless they’re stopped in time. Yes, law enforcement occasionally detains members of these groups, but it hasn’t been able to fully stem the tide — it’s a difficult task.
Could veterans with combat experience eventually connect with these neo-Nazi groups? Most likely not — mainly due to a significant age gap, [since these militant groups are mostly made up of teenagers]. And also because these radicals adhere to a highly rigid ideological platform. They aren’t about Russian patriotism; they’re driven by extreme ideas like “purifying the white race,” and so on. Of course, people with those views can be found in any social group, including among veterans. But I don’t think this would become a widespread trend.
As for the Russian Community and other legal organizations, they’re already actively trying to recruit veterans. And whenever they manage to find someone with combat experience who’s willing to participate in events, they present it as a major success — and highlight it heavily in their public messaging.
Bringing in veterans definitely raises the status of these organizations — both in terms of public perception and within the nationalist movement itself. It also reinforces their loyalty to the government (and loyalty, I should note, is one of the defining traits of today’s Russian nationalists). I don’t think there’s ever been a moment in the history of this movement when nationalists have been this loyal to the current regime.
They support the government almost across the board, offering only occasional mild criticism — and even then, only for being “not tough enough” on certain issues. Unsurprisingly, they support the “special military operation.”
Could more veterans join them in the future? Yes, absolutely. And if that number grows significantly, it’s entirely possible that some of these groups could begin to take on paramilitary traits — just not overnight. It’s something we can’t rule out. I believe that agencies like [Russia’s Center for Combating Extremism] Center E, which are tasked with monitoring this kind of activity, are well aware of this.
For now, most of these organizations still behave relatively peacefully. They rarely resort to direct violence — at most, showing up in large numbers to confront migrants, shouting slogans, staging intimidation campaigns. Physical clashes are still rare. Overall, they try to appear law-abiding.
But all of this walks a fine line. If these groups begin to attract large numbers of veterans — especially those returning with serious psychological trauma — the risks will grow. Of course, we can’t generalize. It all depends on the individuals involved. What [the government] will do about this remains an open question. But we can expect the authorities to keep a close eye on it.
And in fact, we’ve seen something like this before — in 2015, when volunteers from the first wave of the Donbas campaign began returning. There were fewer of them, but many were highly ideological, and many came back deeply disillusioned. Still, the federal government managed that situation fairly effectively. The Union of Donbas Volunteers, led by Alexander Borodai, took on the task: returning fighters were given various forms of support, opportunities to socialize with each other, and were kept busy with semi-military gatherings. And it worked — there were no serious consequences.
It’s worth noting that back in 2015, Russian nationalists were far more oppositional. They still had platforms they could join and they could speak out against the authorities. Today, it’s not even clear where or how such dissent could be expressed. Even the [nationalist] Russian March [demonstration] has disappeared from the public agenda — though what’s forgotten today might resurface tomorrow.
— In your view, what steps are needed to reduce xenophobia and far-right sentiment in Russia? What would it take to improve interethnic and interfaith relations? And most importantly — what role can and should civil society play?
— Well, that immediately raises the question: who exactly is supposed to take these steps? The term “civil society” sounds nice, of course, but in reality, we’re talking about a fairly small number of grassroots initiatives trying to do something in this area. And they’re so few that — with all due respect to their work — their efforts simply aren’t capable of changing the situation in any significant way. You can’t transform such a massive and inertial system through isolated, local efforts — not unless there’s engagement with the state. And in this case, the state isn’t just one of the players; it’s nearly a monopolistic actor.
Something has shifted in the state over the past few years. Yes, mass migration has always generated some level of social tension — that’s nothing new. It’s been discussed, and even exploited for political purposes in the past. But starting in 2021, we’ve seen a fundamentally different process: an overt slide into right-wing populism. The state began making decisions with no rational basis — purely emotional ones, aimed at short-term political gain.
That kind of thing has happened before too, of course. But in the past, these measures would usually fizzle out quickly — they played their propaganda role and then disappeared. Now, though, we’re seeing a continuous process. And as a result, the political regime itself — including its stance on migrants and broader ethnic issues — is starting to shift. I don’t think this is the result of some deliberate plan. It seems more like an unstructured drift — word by word, step by step — driven by a populist logic.
The war probably plays a role here too, though not directly. What I mean is that the state has become much more concerned with maintaining popular support and sympathy. And it seems to see xenophobic rhetoric as an effective way to mobilize that support. Honestly, even from a purely pragmatic standpoint, that doesn’t seem like the smartest strategy. Because in the end, it only makes people more anxious — not less.
I was genuinely struck, for example, by the results of a Levada Center poll last year. They regularly ask a simple, open-ended question: “What issues concern you the most right now?” — with no suggested answers. As usual, rising prices topped the list by a wide margin. But for the first time, migration, ethnic tensions, and related issues shot up to second place — tied with corruption. And corruption, I should note, has always ranked fairly high. That means a campaign that was supposedly intended to “calm” society actually had the opposite effect — it heightened public anxiety.
And the irony is, there wasn’t any objective reason for it. The number of migrants had decreased. The crime rate among migrants — despite what [Investigative Committee Head Alexander ] Bastrykin has claimed — hadn’t gone up, and in fact had slightly declined. In recent years, that figure has remained pretty stable, with only minor fluctuations. But the propaganda campaign created a sense of threat — and in doing so, undermined social stability.